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Introduction
What is the potential of happiness? How can a captured line be free? Is there
hope in hopelessness? In A Thousand Plateaus, radical post-structuralist
philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari write, “only a line of flight [is] forever
in the process of being drawn, toward a new acceptance, the opposite of
renunciation or resignation- a new happiness?” (1987, 207). This “new happiness” is
the central theme of this thesis. I will use Deleuze and Guattari to examine three
seemingly unrelated literary texts: Fodor Dostoyevsky’s White Nights, Lucy Maud
Montgomery’s Anne of Green Gables, and John Green’s Paper Towns. According to
Brian Massumi, celebrated translator of Deleuze and Guattari’s works and an
accomplished philosopher in his own right, when analyzing texts with a Deleuzian
lens, “the reader is invited to lift a dynamism out of the book and incarnate it in a
foreign medium” (8). By lifting Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts out of their own
writing and applying them to the analysis of these works of literature, I will
demonstrate how lines of flight present different ways for the characters to find new
happinesses in their territorialized lives, to varying degrees of success, developing a
new concept of the line of flight as a path to find hope, freedom, and ultimately
happiness in a current world where everything is restricted, regulated, and defined
by all manner of social constructs.
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To accomplish this, this paper will conduct a sustained engagement with
Deleuze and Guattari on their innovative theories for reading literature, first by
introducing some of their important philosophical concepts into the texts as a way
to think about hope, freedom, and happiness, and then using this analysis to
produce new definitions for hope, freedom, and happiness as they function in
modern society. By reading these works of literature in the manner that one reads
philosophy, putting books and ideas together to create something in their
interaction, the books become machines that actively produce new meanings from
the context in which they are read. When interpreting literature by this method, “the
question is not, Is it true? But, Does it work? What new thoughts does it make
possible to feel? What new sensations and perceptions does it open in the body?”
(8). Using these questions, the meanings I will construct from my readings of these
texts will be more than simply a new interpretation of older literature; the analysis
will be the form with which to produce new concepts about the lives of the readers
of these works.

Deleuze and Literature: Using Literature as a Productive Object
Deleuze is one of the most influential French philosophers of the twentieth
century. He produced works on the history of philosophy, including studies on
David Hume, Friedrich Nietzsche, Immanuel Kant, Henri Bergson, Baruch Spinoza,
Michel Foucault, and Gottfried Leibniz, as well as analyses on the arts, cinema, and a
large collection of essays on literature. At the center of his thought was the simple
belief that philosophy is the production of concepts. He collaborated with political
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activist and radical psychoanalyst, Guattari, to create many of his major works: AntiOedipus (1972), A Thousand Plateaus (1980), and What is Philosophy ? (1991).
Deleuze and Guattari are recognized for their unorthodox and heterodox
philosophy, and especially for the way they use language to produce new concepts
that transform post-structuralist Western philosophy. They became known for such
concepts as the line of flight, rhizomes, nomad thought, plateaus, and
territorialization/deterritorialization.
Deleuze and Guattari’s work has paved the way for a whole new way of
thinking about meaning in society. Their ideas can be applied to anything, from
human relationships, works of art, popular culture, to the interstate highway
system; the list goes on forever in infinite directions. The multitude of scholarly
works of this nature has spurred the creation of Edinburgh University Press’s
academic journal, Deleuze Studies. Started in 2007 and in continued publication
today, Deleuze Studies according to Edinburgh Press “is neither a philosophy journal,
nor a literature journal, nor a cultural studies journal, but all three and more.
Articles explore the work of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as well as critical
reviews of the growing field, new translations and annotated bibliographies”
(Deleuze and Guattari Studies).
In addition to this journal, books such as Ian Buchanan and John Marks’
Deleuze and Literature analyze the use of a Deleuzian style of thinking in the study of
literature. Buchanan and Marks say of this type of analysis, “literature can plunge
into the ‘middle’ and exhaust the possibilities of the event, laying them out on a
plane of immanence. In doing so, the writer eschews the ressentiment and the
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tendency towards judgement” (Buchanan and Marks, 2). In other words, Deleuze
and Guattari’s concepts allow for the analysis of literature not as a chronological
explanation of an event or as a piece of language that is “good” or not, but as a
function of language itself, producing meaning through its analysis rather than
within the words and events in and of themselves. “For Deleuze, it is a question of
bringing into existence rather than judging… it is rather a question of being flexible
enough in one’s thinking to allow something new to enter into existence” (2-3).
This is not to say that traditional methods of literary analysis are invalid:
“sometimes it is necessary to restore the lost parts, to rediscover everything that
cannot be seen in the image, everything that has been removed to make it
‘interesting’” (4). Symbols, motifs, extended metaphors, and other figurative
language used by the author to intentionally convey deeper meanings can reveal
much about the moral or purpose of the story in a work of fiction, and the execution
of these techniques provides a structured way with which to measure a writer’s
skill. “But sometimes, on the contrary, it is necessary to make holes, to introduce
voids and white spaces, to rarify the image, by suppressing many things that have
been added to make us believe that we are seeing everything” (4). Using Deleuze
with literature allows meanings to be produced by the reader that were not
intentionally left there by the author for the reader to find, but these meanings are
no less real and affective for the infinite nature of their interpretation.
Deleuze and Guattari themselves have written extensively on literature. “We
will never ask what a book means,” they say, “as signified or signifier; we will not
look for anything to understand in it. We will ask what it functions with, in
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connection with what other things it does or does not transmit intensities [ . . . ] A
book exists only through the outside and on the outside. A book itself is a little
machine” (Deleuze 1987, 4). Deleuze and Guattari’s analyses of books as machines
include writings on Herman Melville’s Bartleby the Scrivener and the novella as a
form. “Bartleby; Or the Formula” is an essay in Deleuze’s Critical and Clinical, a
collection of his literary criticisms. Deleuze focuses on Melville’s formula, “I would
prefer not to,” the line which the main character Bartleby constantly repeats
throughout the story, baffling his employer. Deleuze says “perhaps it is the formula
that carves out a kind of foreign language within the language” (1997, 71). This new
use of the language to produce the phrase “I would prefer not to,” which is neither
grammatically correct nor easy to follow in terms of literal meaning, incapacitates
Bartleby’s boss to do anything to contradict Bartleby because he does not know how
to respond. The formula creates a different language within the language which
takes the language as a whole “into flight, pushing it to its very limit in order to
discover its Outside, silence or music” (1997, 71). There is no hidden meaning in
that particular phrase, “I would prefer not to.” It is the unconventionality of the form
itself that allows for new meaning to be produced outside of the structure and
context known to society, and this departure from convention is what prevents the
boss from being able to respond in any conventional way.
Deleuze breaks down this formula and its use throughout the novella, but
contends from the outset that, “Bartleby is neither a metaphor for the writer nor the
symbol of anything whatsoever. It is a violently comical text, and the comical is
always literal. It is like the novellas of Kleist, Dostoyevsky, Kafka, or Beckett, with
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which it forms a subterranean and prestigious lineage. It means only what it says,
literally” (1997, 68). Throughout his analysis of this Melville work, Deleuze
maintains that the formula Melville uses is not an instrument to explain human
nature, but instead a function to produce new meaning in language. It is not
arbitrary, but it does not lead us back to reason within the literal. The literal exists
only within the story but produces a logic with which to analyze what is outside of
the story. The reader is not supposed to look at the story of Bartleby as life advice
about how to get out of work, but Melville’s story is also not an allegory with a
greater lesson or moral. It is an experiment of language that pushes the boundaries
of convention. When analyzed with a Deleuzian lens, the content of the story of
Bartleby is important only in the fact that it sets up the form, and the literal events
that take place in the story are only important in that they break that form. This use
of literature as an object, then becomes the “point” or “deeper meaning” derived
from the work of literature.
Deleuze also writes about literature in A Thousand Plateaus in the chapter
entitled “1874: Three Novellas, or What Happened.” He uses Henry James’ “In the
Cage,” F. Scott Fitzgerald’s “The Crack Up,” and Pierrette Fleutiaux’s “The Story of
the Abyss and the Spyglass” to produce meanings from these specific works of
literature by using the events of the stories to delineate new concepts of three
different types of life lines. The first is segmented and rigid: “everything seems
calculable and foreseen [ . . . ] so are people as elements of an aggregate, as are
feelings as relations between people; they are segmented [ . . . ] to ensure and
control the identity of each agency including personal identity” (1987, 195). This
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type of life line is of plans and expectations, clearly defined relationships between
people, and categorizing identities of oneself and others. The story, “In the Cage,” is
about a telegrapher who pieces together bits of information about her clients’ lives
through the messages she sends and receives for them. These snippets of
information are the first type of life line that Deleuze produces, not as an intentional
symbol in the novella but by the use of the literature as a machine to produce this
concept. The words and conversations, explanations, and precise knowledge and
facts in the telegrams are not representative of the first type of line, but literally
constitute it.
With the second line, the line of molecular or supple segmentation, “a
present is defined whose very form is the form of something that has already
happened [ . . . ] traveling at speeds beyond the ordinary thresholds of perception”
(1987, 196). The telegraphist finds out more than she wanted to know from her
snooping and learns of the existence of a dark secret, but because she only gets the
information that is in the telegrams, she has to try to piece together the rest of the
story of what happened in her own mind. Whatever happened has already
happened; it is absolutely not imaginary, but there are infinite possible segments
that could make up this unknown, making this life line itself tangled and
deterritorialized, or not able to be defined by any particular set of conventions. The
actual information that is kept secret is not important; it's the existence of a secret
that creates Deleuze’s second type of line.
The third line is the line of flight, which explodes through the segmentary
nature of the other two lines, “attain[ing] a kind of absolute deterritorialization.”
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The telegraphist “ended up knowing so much that she could no longer interpret
anything” (1987, 197). Without areas of unknown, there is no framework on which
to build what is known, there is no direction, and the life line itself becomes a kind
of abstract everywhereness. However, the line of flight is not a final destination; the
three lines continually intermingle, and the telegraphist moves on to marry her
fiancé and leaves the lives she became a part of as the telegraphist to exist as they
are in a variety of types of lines without a single meaning, direction, or end.
Deleuze goes on to use these concepts of different types of lines to interpret
what happens in the stories of the other two novellas to translate them into texts
which produce meanings about real life as well. His interpretations of these three
novellas in A Thousand Plateaus and his essay on Bartleby are formal models in this
essay; their inclusion is to demonstrate how Deleuze and Guattari use literature to
produce concepts about life and use those concepts to produce meanings from
literature. If valid, this process could be done over and over again, always producing
new affects and creating concepts that explain a constantly modern new form of life.

Materials and Method: Posing the Question
The Deleuzian concepts I will apply in the literary analysis are those of deand re- territorialization, lines of flight, and rhizomes, as defined in the introduction
and the section on Nomadology in A Thousand Plateaus. All of these concepts are
examples of nomadic thought, which functions without linear definitions. Rather
than following a preconceived pattern, nomad thought jumps across and between
boundaries of structured spaces in society to create a whole new tracing of the map
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of societal understanding, in the same way as Nomadic people are always moving to
new areas rather than permanently settling down in one location. To use Deleuzian
language, nomad thought deterritorializes spaces that had been fixed and offers
lines of flight towards new experiences and new ways to create meaning. The
pattern, or rather lack thereof, of the line of flight in nomad thought is a rhizome: a
shape with no start or end or direction. The rhizome is instead composed entirely of
the middle and travels not just within the stratified spaces of societal
comprehension but through and beyond them, without points except those of
departure, which are motion themselves. “Every rhizome contains lines of
segmentarity according to which is stratified, territorialized, organized, signified,
attributed, etc., as well as lines of deterritorialization down which it constantly flees.
There is a rupture in the rhizome wherein segmentary lines explode into a line of
flight, but the line of flight is part of the rhizome” (9). Meaning found through
nomadic analysis does not already exist under the surface, there to be found
through interpretation, but is produced as by a machine in its individual social,
historical, or literary context.
The first work of literature I will apply these Deleuzian concepts to is Lucy
Maud Montgomery’s Anne of Green Gables, a lovely children’s bildungsroman about
an optimistic orphaned girl, Anne, as she comes to understand the world of growing
up. Set in early 20th century Prince Edward Island and following the long tradition
of foundling sentimentalist novels of the time, the novel recounts Anne’s many
struggles and wonderful adventures as she settles into normal life at Green Gables,
which is the only home she has ever known. Although Montgomery went on to write
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eight further novels about Anne and later her children, the analysis in this paper will
focus on the first book alone, without considering the plot events to come as fact
within the fictional framework. The next work to be analyzed, Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s
White Nights, is a short story about an unnamed narrator who falls in love with a
flighty girl who ends up going back to her first love and leaving the narrator in
despair, but the text ends before the reader can conclude whether the narrator has
hope for a brighter future. The story takes place in 1848 in Saint Petersburg during
the White Nights festival, a time of year in early summer where the sun never sets
completely, each chapter or section describing the events of one night. The last
novel to be addressed in this analysis is John Green’s Paper Towns. This book is a
philosophical questioning of the pressures society puts on its subjects to fit into a
single predetermined version of success, disguised as a young adult novel about
high school. It takes place around fictional Jefferson Park, a suburb outside of
Orlando, and was published in 2008. Paper Towns tells the story of high school
senior Quentin (Q) Jacobsen and the adventures he has with his friends, filled with
both silliness and mortality, as they try to find Margo Roth Spiegleman: Q’s
childhood friend, lifelong unrequited love, and a classic example of the “Manic Pixie
Dreamgirl” trope.
I have chosen these works not because they have undiscovered meanings or
connections under the surface of the text. I chose these specific works because of
their variety in genres, audiences, and origins to show the continued relevance of
nomadic analysis in a variety of contexts and for their subject matter as they directly
and indirectly address the idea of happiness. The analysis of these works will be
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both a demonstration of what it means to read through a Deleuzian lens in 2020 and
an attempt to reach a greater understanding of how hope, freedom, and happiness
are produced through lines of flight. While the construction of these works varies
drastically, each author has elements of nomad thought in their writing style and
references to concepts derivative of flight lines and the rhizome in their content.
Anne of Green Gables frequently draws on a symbolic idea of the winding path of life
itself in a way that reflects Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas of the line of flight. White
Nights ends with an ambiguous question as the last line, inviting nomadic analysis of
the text as a machine to produce a meaning for the ending and thereby of the entire
story. Paper Towns has frequent significant plot points about maps and traveling
between places to escape the structure of society, which can be used as an example
of Deleuzian deterritorialization. Each of these texts can produce a multitude of
other meanings beyond these preliminary examples when looked at through the
lens of other philosophical concepts, but with this analysis I will focus specifically on
what these meanings come to say about how hope functions in individual lives and
what defines freedom and happiness and how or whether any of it is truly possible.
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Answering the Question
(a).

Anne of Green Gables presents a version of life in which the production of true

happiness, hope, and freedom is inevitable. The story begins as orphaned Anne
Shirley is mistakenly sent to live with brother and sister Mathew and Marilla
Cuthbert, who had intended to adopt an orphan boy to help with farm work. Anne’s
unashamed wonder at the world and unbridled enthusiasm convince the Cuthberts
to keep her anyway as they reluctantly realize the much-needed joy she brings to
their lives. She is judged by the adults of the town for her talkativeness and fanciful
imagination, and her adventurous spirit gets her into trouble numerous times, as
she nearly drowns on a raft while reenacting a play and accidentally gets her friend
and neighbor, Diana Barry, drunk on currant wine while hosting a tea party. Anne
excels in school, partially spurred on by her hatred for fellow classmate and future
love interest, Gilbert Blythe. At age 16, she moves away to the city to get her
teaching license at the Queen’s Academy and at the end of the year, is awarded a
scholarship to pursue a bachelor’s degree, but her dreamy childhood comes to an
abrupt end when Mathew dies of a heart attack. Anne abandons her studies to move
back home with Marilla and finally makes peace with Gilbert when he gives up his
teaching position there so that Anne can work close to home.
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Anne’s boundless imagination is finally reigned in towards reality at the end
of the book, but her optimism is not. Throughout the story, the constant hardship
Anne experiences as an outcast and an orphan does not change her positive outlook
on life, and even with Mathew’s death, she finds a way to hold onto hope. Near the
end of the novel, Anne says, “my future seemed to stretch out before me like a
straight road. I thought I could see along it for many a milestone. Now there is a
bend in it. I don't know what lies around the bend, but I'm going to believe that the
best does. It has a fascination of its own, that bend” (Montgomery, 420-421). This
bend in the road represents the first new concept produced: hope, as defined as the
moment of deterritorialization, and this is the way Anne is able to find happiness in
her constantly re-territorialized life.
As a poor female orphan in rural Avonlea village in Canada in 1908, society
does not allow for many potentials for Anne. Even in her childhood, she is constantly
taught the proper way to act at home by Marilla, at school by a slew of uninspiring
teachers, and at church by both the religious figureheads and all of the judgmental
society ladies in attendance. Anne is always being criticized by society for her
temper, flighty imagination, and constant wonder at the world that sets her apart
from the rest of the proper subjects, which is all symbolized by her red hair.
Montgomery writes of Anne’s first introduction to Mrs. Lynde, who represents
Avonlea society, “Anne came running in presently, her face sparkling with delight of
her orchard rovings; but abashed at finding herself in the unexpected presence of a
stranger, she halted confusedly inside the door [ . . . ] the wind had ruffled her
hatless hair into an over-brilliant disorder; it had never looked redder than at that
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moment” (89). This example is a literal moment of territorialization for Anne, where
her boundless flight potential is suddenly and harshly captured. Yet despite all this
persistent re-territorialization, Anne remains her creative, imaginative, and
wondrous self; a true line of flight.
Anne’s flight line started out entirely deterritorialized as an orphan, so
throughout her life, she always has a surplus of potential happiness within. Even
with all of the hardships and suffering she endures, the pure fact of her
placelessness at the beginning gives her the ability to move between places for the
rest of her life. Anne came to learn that wherever she ends up will not be good, so
she found a way to create joy in the traveling between. She says, “I am not going to
think about going back to the asylum while we’re having our drive. I’m just going to
think about the drive” (52). When the metaphorical and literal drive is over, Anne’s
imagination becomes her tool to deal with her reality, but it is not an escape from
reality. Not every situation has this potential, what Anne calls “scope for
imagination”: “there’s so much scope for imagination in a wind” (106), “there’s no
scope for imagination in patchwork. It's just one little seam after another and you
never seem to be getting anywhere” (126). Anne can’t imagine her territorialization
and repression away, so instead, she uses imagination to live more fully within the
boundaries she has. It is an accentuating of reality, a way of making reality more real
and more hers, and another way of deterritorializing within the territorialized.
Anne renames many things in her life, which is representative of this
accentuating and deterritorializing reality. A patch of flowers in the woods behind
Green Gables becomes “Violet Vale.” The stretch of road that runs between a row of
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apple trees is “the White Way of Delight.” She calls a small pond by another
farmhouse “the Lake of Shining Waters.” She even renames herself Cordelia
Fitzgerald or Rosamond Montmorency or other more “romantic” names. While these
imaginings are only the fancies of a young girl who has experienced more than her
fair share of suffering, they are also her way of finding joy in her life and constantly
producing hope for herself for a better version of reality; they are not totally
imagined spaces, it is renaming real places and things to match the hopeful way in
which Anne views them. Anne says about her “White Way of Delight,” “it’s the first
thing I ever saw that couldn’t be improved upon by imagination” (26). Her
imagination is not what removes her from her world as the adults around her all
believe, but instead is what allows her boundless potential to continue moving
within her world.
The Deleuzian concept of becoming is what enables Anne’s movement and is
also represented by Anne’s renaming of things. “Becoming is a rhizome, not a
classificatory or genealogical tree. Becoming is certainly not imitating, or identifying
with something [ . . . ] Becoming is a verb with a consistency all its own; it does not
reduce to, or lead back to, ‘appearing,’ ‘being,’ ‘equaling,’ or ‘producing’” (1987, 239).
The “White Way of Delight” is not just a name to Anne, it is a real place that
produces real affect for her. A reflection in a mirror and an echo on a hill become
Anne’s friends. She doesn’t just enjoy nature and the world; she becomes acquainted
with them: “Can I take the apple blossoms with me for company?” (Montgomery,
83). Her imaginings produce the real world she lives in. “Now I’m going to imagine
things into this room so they’ll always stay imagined” (84). Anne becomes a seagull,
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a bumblebee, the wind. Her life around her becomes what she imagines it to be, not
just by pretending things are better than they are, but by creating them in the real
world in the way that she perceives them based on the affect they produce for her.
Even when Anne is unhappy, she finds a delight in it too, not because she has
no deep emotions but because she enjoys the completeness of her human
experience. One of these first moments is when Anne loses her temper with Mrs.
Lynde for criticizing her red hair in the moment of literal territorialization
mentioned previously. Marilla tells her she must apologize, and at first Anne refuses
and shuts herself up in her room, resigning herself to a life of imprisonment and
martyrdom, as angry children are wont to do. Partially inspired by Matthew’s
encouragement, she has a change of heart and decides to apologize, completely and
earnestly, to the best of her performative abilities. “There was no mistaking her
sincerity—it breathed in every tone of her voice. Both Marilla and Mrs. Lynde
recognized its unmistakable ring. But the former understood in dismay that Anne
was actually enjoying her valley of humiliation—was revelling in the thoroughness
of her abasement” (101). This scene is intended to be a humorous anecdote about
Anne’s childishly over-dramatic way of dealing with problems in her life, but it is
actually a demonstration of her maturity in understanding the suffering of her life
and her ability to accept it. This is the new happiness Anne is able to find, a
happiness within the confines of her subjectivity, which, combined with her hope in
the moments of deterritorialization in her territorialized life, allows Anne to
experience every part of reality without feeling broken and burdened by it.
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She is never a perfect example of the proper subjectivity society lays out for
her, so she never has to be just any one kind of subject. She is able to imagine herself
into an infinite number of fantasy worlds and subjectivities, so she is always able to
hold onto hope for that next moment of deterritorialization and freedom before she
is re-territorialized again. Anne can exist in all of these subjectivities more
comfortably, too, because she doesn’t fit in any one of them. “There’s such a lot of
different Annes in me. If I was just the one Anne it would be ever so much more
comfortable, but then it wouldn’t be half so interesting” (224). Her multiplicity of
selves better equips her to deal with the constant re-territorialization she faces and
eventually teaches her to territorialize herself. “Anne sighed and, dragging her eyes
from the witcheries of the spring world, the beckoning day of breeze and blue, and
the green things upspringing in the garden, buried herself resolutely in her book.
There would be other springs” (355). At this moment, Anne is literally reterritorializing herself while still being acutely aware of what is outside her current
subjectivity. She learns to exist both inside and outside her roles in society and so
finds a new happiness in all of her subjectivities because of her potential
deterritorialization from them. The coming of a new spring is the moment of hope,
departure, and growth, literally through the roots of the plants forming rhizomes
that allow for expansion by lines of flight; it is still not a symbol, but a physical
example of the meta phenomenon that occurs in Anne’s life. She does not get to
experience every potential, but she is aware that there will always be new moments
of hope in deterritorialization that can only occur in the growth of spring after the
re-territorialization of societal responsibilities in winter.
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This connects back again to the potential of the bend in the road. “Anne’s
horizons had closed in [ . . . ] but if the path set before her feet was to be narrow she
knew that flowers of quiet happiness would bloom along it [ . . . ] nothing could rob
her of her birthright of fancy or her ideal world of dreams. And there was always
that bend in the road!” (427). Anne sees the bigger picture of the rhizome of her life
overall and the many lines of flight that compose it, without imposing a societal
construct of the path it is supposed to take. Unlike the rest of the characters in the
story, Anne has hope without expectations and enjoys the process of the
anticipation itself. Marilla tells her, “you set your heart too much on things [ . . . ] I’m
afraid there’ll be a great many disappointments in store for you through life.” Anne’s
response is, “looking forward to things is half the pleasure of them [ . . . ] You mayn’t
get the things themselves; but nothing can prevent you from having the fun of
looking forward to them” (129). Anne already has experienced many
disappointments in her life, and her line of flight has been recaptured again and
again by the circumstances of society around her, but the recapture of a line of flight
is not hopeless; it is the definition of hope itself. Without obstacles in the way, a line
of flight never forms the full rhizome of a new happiness. Those obstacles, or bends
in the road, give shape to a life, and Anne sees that despite her imaginative youth
and innocence. It is precisely this imagination that gives her the ability to see her life
for all that it is and all that it can be simultaneously at the same time, and this is
what allows her to find a new happiness and hope, even though she is never free.
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(b).

The next story, White Nights, is productive in a different way, producing a

new concept of freedom not by using the characters as a model for how this is
achieved, but because none of them ever truly reach the freedom they believe they
want. The main character/narrator calls himself a dreamer and describes his
reclusive life apart from society, living only through his imagination.
The dreamer—if you want an exact definition—is not a human being, but a
creature of an immediate sort. For the most part he settles in some
inaccessible corner, as though hiding from the light of day [ . . . ] He is rich
now with his own individual life; he has suddenly become rich, and it is not
for nothing that the fading sunset sheds its farewell gleams so gaily before
him, and calls forth a swarm of impressions from his warmed heart [ . . . ] And
it is only after the queer fellow has returned to his comfortable den with
fresh stores for his mind to work on [ . . . ] It has grown dark in the room; his
soul is sad and empty; the whole kingdom of fancies drops to pieces about
him (Dostoyevsky, 12-14).
He sees himself as this cosmopolitan subject, wandering the streets alone, imagining
connections he makes with the strangers he passes, and living through these
imagined connections while hiding from society, but never truly achieving
happiness because reality always sets back in. In this way, the Dreamer represents a
false line of flight and a false freedom, one that always already captures itself
because there was never any potential in the flight to begin with.
At the beginning of the story, the Dreamer describes his solitary wanderings
throughout the city. He knows no one but feels connected to the people he passes
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every day and is comforted by the familiarity of the streets and buildings, even
though he feels as though his life has no purpose or meaning. These wandering form
a rhizome, a pattern without a pattern, an assemblage of lines of flight that have
been captured and then deterritorialized again. He believes that living this life
makes him free, and he believes he wants this freedom, if only he had someone to
share it with. However, when he gets that opportunity and makes a real human
connection, he bases his happiness not on the ability of the flight lines of two people
to form this cosmopolitan rhizome side by side, but by his ability to capture another
line of flight.
That other line of flight is Nastenka, who will become the love interest for the
story. He meets her on the first night by saving her from the unwanted advances of a
drunk man who is also wandering the streets at night. The Dreamer confesses that
he has always dreamed of speaking to a beautiful woman like her but never has
before and feels quite timid, which Nastenka finds appealing in contrast to the
brashness of other men, but she makes him promise that he won’t fall in love with
her. On the second night, Nastenka asks the Dreamer to tell her about himself, but he
contends that he has no history since he has spent his whole life alone and instead
explains who he is as the Dreamer. Nastenka then tells her story: how she grew up
with her strict grandmother, never being able to see the world until the handsome
new lodger in their spare room takes her out to the theatre and she falls in love. The
lodger tells Nastenka that he can’t marry her because he doesn’t have enough
money but promises to return in a year, but the year has now gone by without any
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word from the lodger, and Nastenka has fallen into despair until she meets the
Dreamer.
Nastenka is a line of flight in the story. She is constantly re-territorialized as a
woman but never loses hope in her ability to find happiness within that life anyway.
She believes that she has found a friend in the Dreamer, someone she can be herself
with and someone who will not territorialize her as a woman, only seeing her for
her value as a sexual object. The Dreamer believes at first that this is what he wants
too. He tells her, “in two minutes you have made me happy forever. Yes, happy; who
knows, perhaps, you have reconciled me with myself, solved my doubts!” (10). In
reality, however, he is not in the subjectivity in which he sees himself, as a helpless
line of flight being captured by society; he represents the society that constantly
captures the flight lines of women. It isn’t until the second night that he even asks
her name because “it never entered my head, I felt quite happy as it was…” (12).
This shows that he clearly does not see her as a person but just as an ideal. By the
third night, despite his promise, the Dreamer has fallen in love with Nastenka, or
who she is in his head, but in order to preserve his first connection with another
human, or in order to maintain his control over her, he hides his feelings and helps
Nastenka write a letter to the lodger. Nastenka tells the Dreamer that she loves him
because he hasn’t fallen in love with her, because he is the first man to treat her like
a human and not just an object, which then begins to make the Dreamer feel
alienated from her after all, since he does truly see her as an object to capture and
possess. At the end of the night, Nastenka “flew like an arrow down her side street.
[The Dreamer] stood still for a long time following her with [his] eyes” (25). Only
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Nastenka is a line in flight; The Dreamer is not going anywhere, despite his constant
rovings, and has set his future on a material goal of attainment by territorialization
rather than the motion made possible in deterritorialization.
The fourth night is when the story comes to its climax. Nastenka is
heartbroken again that the lodger has not contacted her, and the Dreamer tries to
comfort her, eventually giving in and confessing his feelings for her. He says his
unrequited love is too painful to remain friends, but Nastenka convinces him to stay,
“if you do not want to leave me alone to my fate, without hope, without
consolation—if you are ready to love me always as you do now” (33). She still
believes in the potentialities of her own line of flight and sees the Dreamer for the
deterritorialized subject he believes himself to be, so there is still a hope for
Nastenka for a new kind of freedom with the Dreamer. Nastenka is ready to give up
on the lodger, but when he suddenly shows up on the street where they are walking.
Nastenka runs back to him, leaving the Dreamer alone again at last.
The final section of the story describes the morning after. The Dreamer reads
a letter Nastenka sent him, apologizing for hurting him and inviting him to her
wedding with the lodger. The Dreamer doesn’t want to resent her for her happiness
but begins to see the world in grey as he resigns himself to be alone forever. His life
seems much bleaker without his imagination to take him out of the real world or his
ability to participate in the real world by using his masculine power to capture
another subject in marriage, but the story ends with a question: “a whole moment of
happiness! Is that too little for the whole of a man’s life?” (37).
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This question refers to the fates of both Nastenka and the Dreamer and
whether either of them attained true happiness, hope, or freedom. Nastenka has
only ever existed as a trapped female subject in bourgeois society. She experienced
one moment of deterritorialization with the Dreamer in the middle of the story, but
she ends recaptured, although perhaps with the possibility for a new happiness
again. As a true line of flight, she does not have a direction or autonomy for herself;
returning to the lodger rather than staying with the Dreamer was just one of many
possible ways she could be re-territorialized, but it does not matter who she ends up
with because as a true line of flight she will always hold onto that hope for a
moment of deterritorialization and live within the new happiness of that potential,
even though she is not free.
The Dreamer, on the other hand, has never been territorialized, but the
freedom he experiences is not truly free. He bases his real happiness on his
masculine power to get married and participate in society to the full extent of his
subjectivity, not on the potentialities of his flight lines to move between and outside
of subjectivities. The Dreamer is not free at all, because the freedom he believes he
is living is all within his comfortable bourgeoisie subjectivity. It is briefly mentioned
that he does have some sort of job, but he spends most of his time wandering the
streets of St. Petersburg. He imagines he connects with the people he passes in his
wanderings, but those connections are only about himself in his own imagination
and not about relating to and understanding the other subjects of society, so he is
not a true cosmopolitan like he believes either. He owns a house and has a maid who
cooks and cleans for him, so he has all the financial freedom to go anywhere and
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escape it all, but instead, he continues along with his life as usual because he does
actually enjoy the comfort of material things.
The Dreamer wants to be territorialized, only imagining that his flight lines
bring him hope and freedom, when it is really this imagination that is preventing
him from feeling real hope or being truly free. “His imagination is again stirred and
at work, and again a new world, a new fascinating life opens vistas before him. A
fresh dream—fresh happiness!” (15), but this fresh happiness is not real or lasting
because it is entirely contrary to reality, rather than built upon it, and it prevents the
Dreamer from taking action in his life, instead of being the tool that opens up his
potentialities. He imagines himself out of reality entirely which means he can’t have
hope—the moment of deterritorialization—if he’s never been territorialized in the
first place. Furthermore, the version of freedom that he thinks he is living doesn’t
bring him happiness anyway. It is the possibility of territorialization that does this,
as represented by his love for Nastenka and his ability to territorialize her, because
you need to have territorialization to have hope, and that is where freedom can
arise. Because the Dreamer believes he is a free line of flight when he is actually
comfortable in his bourgeoisie subjectivity, because he believes he wants
deterritorialization instead of finding the moments of hope within a territorialized
society, and because he bases his happiness on this territorialization of another line
of flight instead of the rhizomatic movements of both lines, he does not have real
hope, he does not recognize his potentials for real freedom, and he does not
experience a new happiness, even in that one moment of connection with Nastenka.
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(c).

The last story, Paper Towns, is somewhat of a combination of both works

discussed thus far. There are two main characters in the book, Margo and Q:
childhood friends who have grown up and grown apart in high school. The story
begins when Margo suddenly jumps back into Q’s life, literally jumping into his
bedroom window at night to rope him into her elaborate revenge plan against those
she feels has wronged her throughout their high school experience. Margo starts out
as a captured line of flight, fed up with the typical suburban life she’s trapped in. She
tells Q, “It’s a paper town [ . . . ] all those cul-de-sacs, those streets that turn in on
themselves, all the houses that were built to fall apart. All those people living in their
paper houses, burning the future to stay warm” (Green, 57). This night was Margo’s
attempt to break away from that, to do something that really matters, even if that
something is only breaking into SeaWorld just to say you’ve done it. Margo admits
that the pleasure isn’t really in doing anything, but in planning it; the planning is
where the actual moment of deterritorialization—hope—takes place, the moment of
departure of a line of flight from its captured course.
Q, on the other hand, likes the routine and simplicity of his life, although he
admits that he wished he didn’t. He is not only accepting but actively willing to buy
into what Margo calls a paper life, where “every moment of your life is lived for the
future—you go to high school so you can go to college so you can get a good job so
you can get a nice house so you can afford to send your kids to college so they can
get a good job so they can get a nice house so they can afford to send their kids to
college” (33-34), but Margo shows him a different version of life that he is drawn to
as well in that night of shenanigans. Margo doesn’t just show Q how to have fun like
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in a typical high school narrative; she shows Q the outside, and from that moment
on, Q has the potential to become a line of flight himself. Even so, at the end of the
night, he comes to the conclusion that “the pleasure for me wasn’t planning or doing
or leaving; the pleasure was in seeing our strings cross and separate and then come
back together” (78). Q wonders if everything will go back to normal the next
morning, or if Margo will leave her clique of the popular people to hang out with Q
and the band geeks. He saw their lines come back together that night and wants
them to stay that way. Instead, Margo disappears. Q is confused and infuriated that
even the police blow off her disappearance as just another unhappy legal adult
finally going off on her own, so when Q finds a clue that she left for him, he decides
to find her himself.
Q’s search leads him to derelict strip malls and subdivisions that were
abandoned before they even began, dubbed “paper towns.” The clues he finds are
abstract, references to Walt Whitman poetry and song lyrics. He begins to believe
that she committed suicide and the clues she left are just leading him to her body, or
that she didn’t really want to be found at all. “I had my hopes: maybe Margo needed
to see my confidence, maybe this time she wanted to be found, and to be found by
me” (115). He realizes in his search that he had only ever seen the version of Margo
that he had idealized in his mind, and he realizes that she is a real person living her
life and not just a prize to be won. Q’s dedication to his search makes him skip
events that ought to be defining moments of his high school life because his search
for Margo has shown him the futility of those societal markers of progress, and he
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ends up spending prom night in the abandoned strip mall where Margo used to
write her plans, trying to understand who she is or was.
It made me think about all the ways I’d mis-seen Margo. There was no
shortage of ways to see her. I’d been focused on what had become of her, but
now with my head trying to understand the multiplicity of grass [ . . . ] I
realized that the most important question was who I was looking for. If “What
is the grass?” has such a complicated answer, I thought, so, too, must “Who is
Margo Roth Spiegelman?” Like a metaphor rendered incomprehensible by its
ubiquity, there was room enough in what she had left me for an infinite set of
Margos. (173).
Q finally sees Margo as this infinite line of flight, running away not just so she can be
found again but because she has unlimited potential for where she can go, but this
realization does not make Q any less determined to find her anyway.
With his new view of Margo as a line, rather than just one point, Q sets out to
find the points where she has been to try to trace a line on a map of where she is
going. Q and his friends plan out possible routes she could be taking based on a
handful of brochures for tourist destinations that they believe belonged to her, but
none of these touristy road trips seem to fit the Margo they know. This is because
“the rhizome is altogether different, a map and not a tracing” (1987, 12). There is no
line they can trace to find Margo, metaphorically or literally: they can find the points
where she is territorialized, but they can’t draw a map of all of her because she is a
constantly escaping line of flight forming the map in the process. Q realizes then that
he will never be able to understand who she is, only who she was, because he can
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follow her lines, but he is always behind, and she is always already somewhere else,
and the tracing of the map produces an entirely different meaning than that of the
map itself. Yet “do not even lines of flight, due to their eventual divergence,
reproduce the very formations their function was to dismantle or outflank?” (1987,
13). Q’s search for Margo through constant directionless lines of flight rarely brings
him any closer to finding the current Margo either physically or emotionally, but it
does open up his potentials to live the same kind of uncaptured life of his own after
becoming so aware of the outside to the life of territorialization he has always been
content with.
Q gets as close to understanding Margo as he ever will on his last day of high
school, cleaning out his locker and experiencing for the first time what it feels like to
really leave without ever coming back: “and as paralyzing and upsetting as all the
never agains were, the final leaving felt perfect. Pure. The most distilled possible
form of liberation” (Green, 228). Q finally experiences complete deterritorialization
and finally understands that Margo did not just set up a wild treasure hunt for him
to follow because the leaving feels too good to be looking back and setting up tracks
the whole time. Most of the clues they found were not left for them on purpose, and
so these accidental trails give the most accurate glimpse into who Margo is when
she isn’t being anyone for anyone else, and these moments are their best chance at
finding her.
On graduation day, after finding one last definite clue that Margo had never
intended to be seen, Q and his friends go on a spontaneous road trip to Agloe, New
York, a town created by mapmakers as a copyright trap that became real when
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developers built a general store at that location: a different kind of “paper town.”
This paper town had become real, and Margo hopes that this is where her paper life
can become real too. “The derelict space is a zone of indeterminacy that bodies-inbecoming may make their own” (Massumi, 104). Margo’s abandoned strip mall and
this abandoned general store become the places where she can be herself and reach
her potential to escape, and Margo becomes more real when she is in these places
and moving between them, rather than being lost and in need of rescue to rejoin the
real world.
This is why when they find Margo here, it is not the heartfelt reunion Q was
still secretly hoping for. He no longer can pretend that any of the version of Margo
he had in his head was real, but she realizes that her actions do have real impacts on
people too, no matter how far she goes to disappear. “Even though autonomous
zones are derelict spaces that become sites of escape, they should not be thought of
as ‘outside’ the existing structures in any straightforward sense. Escape always
takes place in the World As We Know It” (105). Q convinces Margo to keep in touch
with her family even while she runs away for the rest of her life, and Margo invites Q
to join her as an outcast, but both realize that it would never work: Q likes to plant
roots, and Margo likes to rip them up. “Leaving feels good and pure only when you
leave something important, something that mattered to you. Pulling life out by the
roots. But you can’t do that until your life has grown roots” (Green, 234). Q believes
in planting those roots for the future and existing within his territorialized life
because it is simple, and Margo only grows her roots and allows herself to be
territorialized so she can deterritorialize herself again.
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Ultimately, Q and his friends return home to continue on their socially
approved life paths to college and careers, and Margo continues in her attempt to
avoid all of that, constantly living within the thrill of leaving. Both learn that life is
not a book or movie to romanticize into an adventure story and that people are not
who they are in your head, but both learn, too, that the only escape is to keep going,
and that human connections can be made when you least expect it and will always
have an impact on individual lives. “I can almost imagine a happiness without her,
the ability to let her go, to feel our roots are connected even if I never see that leaf of
grass again” (274). Q and Margo both find their new happinesses in the end,
separate but connected through the past and traveling forever in their own
directionless rhizomes, without relying on a false hope for their lines to cross again
one day.

(d).

Margo is the truest line of flight in any of the works discussed. Like Anne, she

is constantly re-territorialized, but unlike Anne, the power of the system is not
enough to discipline her, and her flight line actually reaches its full potential of a
total escape. In some sense, she will always be re-territorialized again even after her
escape, because “bodies in flight do not leave the world behind. If the circumstances
are right, they take the world with them—into the future” (Massumi, 105). Margo
does need to get a job here and there to survive and she remains in contact with her
younger sister, but Margo’s line of flight will always have unlimited potential, and
she can leave at any time, flying through her life in a constant state of
deterritorialization by constantly deterritorializing her world as she goes. Unlike
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Anne, Margo does not find joy in the moment of recapture because of hope for the
moment of escape again. Instead, her happiness is entirely within this moment of
deterritorialization, and she cannot find freedom in any part of territorialized life.
Nastenka is essentially the opposite: she knows her life only has the potential
for more capture, so she finds her freedom by choosing between the few un-free
choices she has. Unlike Anne, she was not free from the beginning and therefore did
not have the same infinite potential to be deterritorialized again, but like Anne,
Nastenka experiences much more severe sexism in her society and knows that
ultimate escape as a true infinite line of flight is impossible. Margo has this potential
because her society does not as strictly require every woman to become an object
belonging to a man in marriage, but instead, Margo’s suburban capitalist subjectivity
is the apparatus that confines her. These three female characters in the works
represent lines of flight under varying degrees of confinement with varying degrees
of potential, and because of this, the methods of finding hope, the levels of freedom
discovered, and the versions of a new happiness achieved are different for each.
For the male characters, Q and the Dreamer, territorialization means
something different. It is still the lack of freedom, but it is also the source of their
power. Q and the Dreamer both desire territorialization and fetishize their love
interests as the manic pixie dream-girl to capture; “it can happen in love that one
person’s creative line is the other’s imprisonment” (1987, 205). Unlike the Dreamer,
however, Q realizes this and comes to accept Margo as a real, complete,
uncapturable human because he came to understand true deterritorialization
through her. He realizes that he does not truly want to capture her line of flight but,
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rather, wants to capture his own. He is entirely aware of the choice he makes to reterritorialize himself at the end because he does not feel an entrapment in that life,
but instead a freedom within the captured potential itself. This is because as middleclass, male, bourgeoise subjects, Q and the Dreamer are not trapped in that life. They
represent the state apparatus itself in direct conflict with the nomad subject that the
females in these stories are, the Dreamer believes himself to be, and Q chooses not
to be.
The Dreamer is an imaginer like Anne, but he does not use imagination to
make hope out of reality like Anne. This is because he does not need to: his hope and
happiness are within the system, so his imaginings of dreams outside the system can
only be false and reproductive of the system, not productive of the outside. The
Dreamer imagines that he is a nomad subject like Margo, but he never actually
leaves the subjectivity that gives him his power, so he does not reach any
deterritorialized potential. As for Nastenka, she is never more than an object to him,
so he does not even notice the potential she has for escape, let alone notice that he is
the one capturing her, not the one captured by his own subjectivity. Q is like
Nastenka in some ways, too, both characters buying into the system in order to
move within it, but Nastenka never actually has the potential to choose to be
territorialized or not, whereas Q makes that choice even after discovering the
outside. Like Anne, Q finds happiness within territorialized parts of life because of
the knowledge of the completeness of it all, but unlike Anne, his main pleasure in
deterritorialization is not because of the deterritorialization itself but in the
potential for re-territorialization again. He plants roots to rip them up to be able to
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plant more roots again, while Anne plants roots because of her appreciation for the
roots themselves and rips them up when she has the chance to experience that thrill
too.
Q is the manifestation of every version of hope, freedom, and happiness, both
real and false, and he is exposed to all of the potentials both inside territorialization
and in deterritorializing itself, but his life is not a model for the right way to
experience any of it; he just happened to be born into a subjectivity with the
freedom to choose not to be unlimitedly free. This does not make him the villain in
his story, nor is the Dreamer the villain in his, nor are the female characters
automatically heroes in theirs. Gender politics is not what determines good and bad,
but the genders of these characters do determine their individual subjectivities, and
the potentials of their subjectivities determine the ability of each to become a line of
flight. Each character is only an effect of their context that can produce affect and
serve as examples in the production of the new concepts of hope, freedom, and
happiness.

37

Discussion: What Does the Question Do?
The purpose of this analysis has not been to interpret these works of
literature, to emphasize this point again. The purpose is to produce new concepts
that can be applied in the current world to produce new meanings in real, current,
human lives. The totalizing system of capitalism that defines those real, current,
human lives, traps those who are impoverished or in any minority without any
opportunities to escape. “Modern power [ . . . ] implies processes of normalization,
modulation, modeling, and information that bear on language, perception, desire,
movement, etc., and which proceed by way of microassemblages” (1987, 458). In
other words, modern power enforces and reproduces itself without the subject even
knowing it is doing so, let alone knowing how to escape it. In “Ideology and
Ideological State Apparatuses,” Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser describes this
entrapment with his concept of interpellation. Through this process, a subject is
hailed into their subjectivity, believing it is by their choice that they identify
themselves in that way, and therefore acting out their own entrapment in that
subjectivity. “Ideology has always-already interpellated individuals as subjects,” but
“the individual is interpellated as a (free) subject in order that he shall (freely) accept
his subjection” (Althusser, 302-303). Ideological State Apparatuses, such as the
education system, cause subjects to interpellate themselves into captured
subjectivities and territorialize our world to the point that it appears totally
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inescapable, and hope, happiness, and freedom, by the general definitions, seem
impossible. However, the new definitions of these concepts are produced by the
analysis of literature and are also directly produced by the context of their
production, which is this current territorialized world; therefore, the new concepts
are not impossible at all, but in fact an exact condition of the current world.
The new hope produced in this work is not about ignoring our reality or
wishing for the impossible; it’s about the moment of deterritorialization where a
line of flight can take you to a new moment of territorialized reality. Hope is not a
resignation to entrapment, it is a necessary condition of becoming captured, and
capture is a necessary condition of hope. It is thinking about the drive, no matter
where the drive is taking you. Constant territorialization of a flight line with
potential produces constant hope; and the fetishization of a deterritorialized line as
an object to hope for only produces a false hope for hope itself. Hope is different in
this way for each individual person because the rhizome of a path of life is never
repeatable by any other life, but the process as the moment of deterritorialization,
the instant a line takes flight, produces hope no matter how or when it is recaptured
again. “A path is always between two points, but the in-between has taken on all the
consistency and enjoys both an autonomy and a direction of its own” (1987, 380). It
is because of this that for one to feel hope, one must first be territorialized, and
without territorialization, there can be no hope. This is not to say that without pain,
there can be no joy because pain and entrapment are not synonymous, nor is joy the
equivalent of freedom.
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Freedom, in its general sense, is the primary myth of wage labor and
capitalism. The new freedom is about freedom within the system. Althusser’s
interpellation, while also an apparatus of the system to maintain itself, also presents
a method of movement within this system: subjects can de-interpellate themselves
as one subject and re-interpellate themselves into a different, more “free”
subjectivity. To make this escape of de-interpellation as a line of flight, a subject
must be able to recognize themselves as a subject, and to do this they must
recognize an outside of their subjectivity. Therefore, while individuals cannot
remove themselves from the system itself, there are gaps in the framework of
control through which subjects can find a path to a new subjectivity, and a new
freedom. The new freedom is about this movement between and within
territorialization and the lines of flight that produce this movement. It is not about
escaping to somewhere outside of the system, because that place does not exist.
Instead it is the motion itself that produces freedom.
The new freedom is individual, not universal. While deterritorialization as a
concept has the potential to dismantle power structures, the individual
deterritorialization of one person alone does not. Even when subjects think they are
pursuing freedom in their own lives, they are just reinforcing the system that
confines them—interpellation. In order to subvert the system, the typical process of
escape must be subverted, because that process was given by the state, and
therefore can never overcome the state, while simultaneously making the individual
think they have found a potential path to freedom from the state on their own. The
false freedom given by the state is in the hope of getting outside of the system to
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destroy it, but that is a futile conquest because the Repressive State Apparatuses of
the military and prison system are too strong for the individual to destroy, and there
is no complete outside from the state because of the Ideological State Apparatuses
anyway. It can only be cracked from within by infinite individual flight lines through
the structure. That is why I define a new freedom for individuals in the world today,
one that does not require subjects to abandon every part of the life they knew or
sacrifice their personal peace and happiness for the greater cause of overthrowing
oppression. There is a freedom that exists in finding the loopholes within the
oppression and living a free life unnoticed by those in power. That alone does not
destabilize anything, even though it does not necessarily reinforce it either, but the
hope for a more universal degree of freedom comes in only when many subjects
have begun to pursue their own personal freedom. Only then could the system be
dissolved by the sheer number of loopholes poked in it. Deterritorialization happens
through lines and motion, and the directions of motion for individuals always has
more potential than that of the group. This is due to the fact that not every
individual has the same potential for freedom, but if enough bourgeoisie subjects do
and enough pursue that potential, in that way the structure can be revolutionized in
its entirety. It's a kind of hope within the hopelessness, achieving freedom only
when the direct fight for it is discontinued. This new freedom only creates the
potential for deterritorialization and therefore the possibility of a new hope, but it
does not create happiness in itself.
A new happiness isn’t about attaining things that typically mark success:
money, power, material possessions, freedom from society, dreams, or ambitions. It
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is about living within the rhizomatic path of de- and re-territorialization, finding the
fascination and freedom in the shape of the whole as it goes, and enjoying each
moment of hope by reimagining the present as the possibility for a new happiness.
Finding it is not a destination; there are no correct versions; each person’s
individual life line is always already “correct” because it is the one that is. The
system of power relations determining subjectivity is not the evil entity preventing
happiness, but rather the machine that produces it. It serves as a direct contrast to
the new free, hopeful, and happy subject, but in this way gives these concepts their
meanings. Outside of the state apparatus there is nothing; only inside is there
potential for a meaningful new hope, freedom, or happiness because only inside the
machine of an existing context can meaning be produced at all.

Conclusion
A new happiness is not a lens, but it is a way of viewing. It is entirely external
but is entirely produced from the recognition of the outside by the inside. “The State
gives thought a form of interiority, and thought gives that interiority a form of
universality” (1987, 375), but the only thing universal about a new happiness is that
it is universally not universal. It is distinctly limited in its form but unlimited in its
affect. It is not a resignation to fate but an appreciation of the entirety of the past
and potential futures and the process of becoming them. It does not hide reality or
glorify/fetishize it, but it does not place expectations on what anything should be.
“Dream about it all, expect nothing, and enjoy the surprises” (Jessie Buckley). The
new happiness is an immanent path and an infinite moment. It happens all at once
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but goes on forever because it is the process that brings happiness, but like a
rhizome, the process has no beginning, end, or points in the middle. Hope,
happiness, and freedom are all interconnected, but none of them spell out the exact
procedure to achieve any of the others because there is no direction of movement
between these concepts. It is all movement—freedom—which cannot exist without
the moment of deterritorialization—hope—to go in the direction of a new
happiness, which is the process of all of this itself, but there are no steps in the
process because it is always already in action anyway.
This analysis does not teach anything. “[She] who is writing these lines and
the reader who reads them are themselves subjects” (Althusser, 299). There are no
outsider-perspective secrets to life here, because none of it can ever occur outside. It
has nothing to do with the discipline of psychology; the philosophy has no pretense
of advice. It is merely productive: of meanings in literature, concepts based on these
meanings, and the new meanings that these concepts produce again. It is like a cycle
in that it has no beginning or end, but it is a rhizome in that it departs in the middle
without any points of departure. This is not a metaphor, but a directly literal
observation. Hope, happiness, and freedom, too, are not metaphors, either in the
literature or in real life. They are machines produced by machines, producing more
machines. Their ability to produce affect does not stop when they are out of the
context of the literature, just as this essay does not end when there are no more
words on the page, which is going to happen now.
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